But it is not at all clear that happiness and unhappiness are the most strategic variables to be used in studying marital institutions. Sociologically, the most important justification for the study of divorce is not that we thereby deal with unhappiness, but that we thereby locate and analyze points of strain, personal and social. Strain points seem to be strategic for beginning an analysis of social structures. In the same fashion, it is possible that personality strain is important for understanding the somewhat narrower field of personality phenomena.
(1) We can, at such strain points, most effectively observe (a) the conflicts of values, and (b) the antagonisms and inconsistencies among the various roles played by an individual, or among statuses occupied by the same or different individuals. (2) How people decide between such strains tell us in part the direction of future social change. (3) The distribution of such strains suggests the extent to which different values are actually believed in (if they are not believed in, they cannot create strain. (4) The punishments and rewards meted out to individuals who decide one way rather than another tell us of the intensity with which given values are held by the society. (5) Finally, it is at such strain points that we can locate the most important variables in the decision-making process.
A study of postdivorce adjustment, then, deals with one such strain point, the decision to divorce; and with the sequel to that resolution. Divorce is a strain point within a kinship system that values marital stability highly.
But the points of strain in a society cannot be defined in merely literary terms, and they are not identifiable with merely personal tragedy, or even with what is known as "social problems." Pain, sadness, or even public indignation are not adequate criteria for either social strain or personal disorganization, although they may all be correlated somewhat with one another. For example, there is pain in a ritual ordeal such as sub-incision or scarification, but these are prepared for by anticipatory socialization of the individual, and by the immediate preparations of the group for the ritual. Predesignated groups carry out anxiety-reducing activities which lower the personal threat, or even the possible group threat, implicit in these situations. Similarly, there is sadness in bereavement, but this is not a strain point for the social structure.
It is, rather, sociologically crucial that such points are where values, norms, and role obligations come into conflict with one another. Put another way, strain points are where we have moral options or choices as, for example, between being a good father or a good employee, a good friend or a loyal citizen.
Consequently, marital unhappiness can not be taken as an index of strain on the kinship structure. There is no problem of moral choice between unhappiness and happiness. Leaving aside the neurotic, we do not feel ashamed if we are happy, or morally triumphant if we are unhappy. There is no competition between unhappiness and happiness, and only under the most deviant circumstances will anyone advocate either on moral grounds.
The assertion that happiness is not of prime significance sociologically is not common, and deserves further comment. Social action is the resultant of choice, and the basis of the choice is one or more norms: rationality, beauty, self-expression, monogamy. We sometimes fail to see this fact, because we habitually phrase the choice as one between (a) a given norm, and (b) happiness. But this is loose phrasing. The choice in this type of situation -- shall I be tempted by tobacco, rich food, or a pretty girl? -- can be analyzed properly as only two kinds of choice, both of them being viewed in normative terms: (1) Conformity with or violation of a given norm (e.g., monogamy); or (2) A choice between conflicting norms (monogamy, vs. "self-expression," "spontaneity," "experience," or bon-vivant-Casanova-masculinity).
Viewed in rigorous sociological terms, these are not choices between "conformity and happiness." Such a phrasing reflects our self-dramatizing, literary inclinations, rather than fact. In point of fact -- both commonsense, and sociological-there is some happiness in conforming to values which we hold. For particular circumstances and individuals, this pleasure may not be so great as would result from violating the norm, but then the choice is strictly speaking between adhering to the norm, or violating it. The consequences must also be chosen: one measure or type of pleasure or contentment, against another; or one set of undesired results, against another.
Thus, if we are married, we may indeed be "tempted," but our choice is between conformity to the norm of monogamy, or violation of it. In our generation, other relevant norms also play a role, such as "being free." And the choice of consequences is not, once again, "happiness vs. conformity." We have a moral objection to "being unfaithful," and succumbing to temptation would violate that norm, and to some degree make us unhappy. Indeed, the society would not survive at all if the choice were between conformity and happiness. Conformity could never win. One can formulate a sort of hedonistic theory in which the members of the society are viewed as choosing among various kinds of happiness-the happiness of fatherhood, motherhood, philanthropy, devotion to the church, hard work, movies, sports, etc. Or, one can translate all choices into choices of a normative character, structured by a system of rewards and punishments in the society. But it is a false view of social action to think of norms as isolated from "happiness," and thus offered as a choice, or option, contrasted with happiness.
Consequently, the attempts to predict marital happiness are not likely to be strategic sociologically. Moreover, the concrete attempts to predict marital happiness have usually failed precisely where a general theory of social organization has not been used. In particular, a marriage is a boundary-maintaining system whose stability results from many factors in interaction, and the "happiness" of its members also results from those same factors. It is more important to study that stability than the much more variable item of happiness. If we analyze the breakdown of that system, we must locate the strain points, i.e., the situations or structural loci at which normative choices are made. If we do this, then there is no sociological need to measure in addition that emotional conglomerate we call happiness.
No comments:
Post a Comment