Theoretical Importance of Divorce
In the light of these hypotheses, divorce as a phenomenon and as an experience is theoretically very interesting. It is closely tied to several sets of strong value patterns relating to the family and to marital conflict. It is an index of interpersonal strain, and within our own society it is also an index of strain in the social structure, in that (a) there are many strong, if gradually weaker, moral proscriptions against it; but (b) in spite of these proscriptions, the divorces continue to occur and the rate of divorce continues to rise as a mass phenomenon. Moreover, (c) since marital stability in our society is morally approved, since the roots of this attitude are to be found in the three major sects of the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, and since divorce is also judged to be an act of self-seeking or of moral failure, it is likely that few couples divorce in our culture without a guilt component on both sides with specific reference to the divorce (aside from guilts with other sources). Thus, on both the psychodynamic and the socio-structural levels there are interesting ramifications.
Furthermore, (d) divorce as a large-scale solution for marital conflict is a relatively recent reappearance in the cultural history of Western society (for Rome in its "decline," as for Athens, the rate must have been high), yet it has been an always potentially institutionalized element in the social structure because of its many Semitic religious antecedents (both Arab and Hebrew, of course). Since these potentialities did not become actual, divorce as a social deviation is in certain respects not like crime or juvenile delinquency, treason or sacrilege.
These latter and other violations are like divorce in that they can be predicted to some extent on the basis of individual characteristics, and to a very great extent on a mass basis. However, they are very different in that prescribed modes of official and unofficial behavior exist for dealing with such deviations. We are socialized to react against these deviations with a fairly specific behavioral and emotional set, and we are even told to some extent how they ought to be punished.
This is not the case for divorce. Neither the participants nor their close friends and relatives have been taught to react in a culturally approved fashion with respect to divorce. We are all taught how to grieve at the death of a relative. We are not taught how we should behave as a divorcee. We are given many culturally approved rationalizations for failing to achieve high status in our occupation, but we are not taught how to solve or to adjust to the failure of our marriage. The general preferences in our culture for rationalistic approaches to problems fail us in this area of great emotionality. Consequently, we should expect to find a set of social phenomena of considerable interest for understanding the family patterns in our culture. Finally, since divorce is a personal and often familial crisis, study of it should add to our knowledge about how individuals adjust to crises.
Divorce in Ancient Law Codes
From earliest times and among all peoples, as qe have seen, marriage and divorce have been human experiences around which group habits or folkways have accumulated. These have grown into publicly approved customs which have been handed down as social traditions and have in turn become imbedded in civil law. Thus we find in the early law codes of ancient civilizations many of the customs of preliterate peoples preserved either in similar or in modified forms.In a few of the lower, and in most of the higher, levels of civilization the ideal of marriage is that of a lifelong union of husband and wife. For many reasons this ideal has never wholly been realized in actual experience. The relations entered into at marriage frequently cease. In order to redefine the status of the separated parties, to provide for offspring, and to determine the rights of property, societies have been under the necessity of developing experimentally habitual procedures and of enacting them into rules and regulations. This has been the chief function of law in regard to divorce. Ancient law is far more the codification of emergent behavior uniformities than it is a means of imposing upon the group the arbitrary dictates either of an individual or of a collective will.
A cursory review of the divorce procedures of a few of the ancient codes will be instructive. It will disclose the attitude of ancient historic societies in regard to the subject and their methods of dealing with it. Our chief object in presenting this survey of ancient legislation, aside from its historical value, is to strengthen the position already taken in reference to the secular nature of marriage and divorce. If in any instances regulations are modified by religious influences, it is in the same sense that economic and other social institutions generally are so modified. In the digest of the codes herewith presented we shall see how competent societies have felt themselves to be to deal with the matter.